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Creative Destruction in the Australian Videogames Industry  
The games industry is usually considered exemplary of the structures of global production in ‘an 
era of spatially-dispersed and casualised labour under a global regime of huge media 
conglomerates’ (Miller, 2016). It is characterised by astounding growth – overtaking music and 
film in global sector size some years ago – and with rapid innovation cycles (for example, 
platform and device innovations and modes of player engagement) (Adolph, 2011: 17). Larissa 
Hjorth (2014) itemises seven generations in the history of games since their birth in the early 
1970s, and that only takes the history to the battles between Sony PSP and Nintendo DS 
handhelds, and the Wii, Xbox360, and PS3 for game console dominance.  A whole new 
generation of games as mobile apps has meant another massive change, making the industry in 
critical ways unrecognisable from what it looked like a few years ago. 
In this article, we use Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) concept of ‘creative destruction’ which, 
according to Wikipedia, is ‘a term originally derived from Marxist economic theory which refers 
to the linked processes of the accumulation and annihilation of wealth under capitalism’. The 
recent history of Australian videogames production is a story of great destruction of jobs, 
companies and value accompanying a move away from the fee-for-service model, but which, at 
the same time, has seen the reassertion of games developers’ core professional identities, 
significant experimentation with a range of business models, and an emerging, productive 
diversity of developer and industry cultures across the three main sites of the industry 
(Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney – games development in Australia has largely been 
concentrated in Melbourne and Brisbane with some activity in other cities including Sydney and 
Canberra (Apperley and Golding, 2015: 58-61)).  Treating ‘capitalism as a complex adaptive 
system, deeply conflictual in its processes and effects’ (Cunningham et al., 2015: 152), as we 
do in this study, has implications for a more nuanced and balanced approach to industry 
transformations than seen in Toby Miller’s account of global media production with which we 
started, and, indeed, in much critical media, communication and cultural studies. 
We first set out the details of the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the rapid shift to 
mobile applications that triggered the collapse of the Australian industry as it had been 
constituted. We then investigate what made the destruction ‘creative’ in terms of professional 
identity and diversification of business models, and outline how variations in production cultures 
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in Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney suggest that a more diverse ecology is emerging that may 
have greater resilience in facing future shocks. 
The recent history of the Australian games industry: A ‘perfect storm’ of change 
Videogames play a significant role as both a sub-sector of the Australian media industries and 
as an embedded part of Australian popular culture. According to NPD Group Australia, revenue 
generated by retailers from console hardware, games software and gaming peripherals was 
AUD$1.161 billion in 2012 (Moses, 2013). The most recent of the Interactive Entertainment 
Association of Australia’s commissioned studies on the Australian videogames market (Brand et 
al., 2014) reports that 93% of homes have a device for playing games and that 65% of 
Australians play videogames with an average player age of 32 years. 
The videogames development industry has been active in Australia for just over three decades. 
Melbourne’s Beam software, founded in 1980, was Australia’s first games development studio. 
Thomas Apperley and Daniel Golding’s (2015) short history of the industry notes that Beam’s 
The Hobbit, released in 1982 for the ZX Spectrum, went on to sell over a million copies and 
provided the foundation for the growing local industry, which was largely based on a work-for-
hire model, producing games for the major international publishers, especially US giants 
Electronic Arts and Activision. Melanie Swalwell’s (2012a; 2012b; also see 2009) work on the 
history of Australian videogames identifies the significance of 1980s micro computing to their 
evolution. Her work highlights the need for historical research about local Australian games 
production and foregrounds that, while the industry is very much a global phenomenon, it is 
deeply embedded in local conditions.  
A recent ‘perfect storm’ of factors have combined to change the face of the Australian games 
industry. The industry had developed on the model of work-for-hire producing ‘catalogue fillers’ 
for the major publishers. Very few AAA titles were made in Australia – Auran’s Dark Reign 1997, 
Team Bondi’s L.A.Noire 2011, 2K Australia’s Bioshock series 2007-2013, are the exceptions 
(Hinton, 2009). However, the business proposition was buttressed by more than a decade of 
favourable exchange rates which (literally) underwrote international investment (as it also 
strongly influences film and television runaway production). Work for hire/licensed IP was the 
bedrock of the Australian industry, with very little original IP being produced. Publishers not only 
owned the finished product, but also the source code (and on occasion the games engine itself). 
The industry by 2007 was structured around approximately 45 mid-size small businesses (ABS, 
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2008). These companies included Krome, Pandemic, THQ StudioOz, Creative Assembly, Torus 
and 2K. 
The global financial crisis saw higher-end production scaled back and a withdrawal by the major 
publishers from spatially distended supply chains and their preference for contracting for product 
with only formally-affiliated production companies. At the beginning of 2007, the Australian dollar 
was worth US 75 cents. During the GFC, the Australian dollar became a ‘currency haven’, such 
that by the start of 2012 it was worth US$1.02, gutting the industry of its pricing advantages. Of 
even greater structural consequence for the industry was the simultaneous explosion of apps-
based mobile casual games play based on the smartphone platform and then also the tablet. 
Commercially successful games exploiting the new distribution modes included Zynga titles such 
as Words for Friends and Farmville, Supercell’s Clash of Clans, King’s Candy Crush and 
Australian developer Halfbrick’s Fruit Ninja. Keogh (2015) sees the emergence of independent 
videogames developers who are no longer reliant on large international developers and 
publishers as a major structural shift. Apperley and Golding (2015, 61) assert that these 
independent Australian developers are now ‘the new mainstream’: ‘such companies now form the 
backbone of Australian game development’.  
Official statistics tell a stark story of the fall-out from these industry changes on Australian 
developers, especially job losses and studio collapses. Of the 1431 reported employees in 
2007, by mid-2012 only 581 remained, and reported game development income had dropped 
from AUD$116.9 million to just AUD$44.4 million (ABS, 2013). Between 2003-2007, the 
employment base had doubled from around 700 to the reported figure of over 1400 – so the 
decline was that much more abrupt and painful. The industry’s revenue streams were massively 
exposed to overseas work for hire, and when this work dried up the local industry collapsed. 
Work for hire accounted for about 80% of the industry’s total income. The industry’s regional 
pattern in 2007 evidenced a significant presence in Queensland (695 employees) and Victoria 
(472), with additional studios in New South Wales (103), the Australian Capital Territory and 
South Australia (161 combined).  
From 2009-2012, the majority of the bigger studios closed and the industry retreated to become 
concentrated in Victoria. Those whose doors closed or radically downsized included Krome, 
Pandemic, THQ StudioOz, BlueTongue, Team Bondi, SEGA Creative Assembly, and Tantalus 
Media Brisbane. The major studios remaining were Halfbrick (Brisbane), 2K Australia 
(Canberra) and in Melbourne, Big Ant, Torus Games, Tantalus and Wicked Witch. Many of the 
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survivors were significantly diminished from pre-GFC days. International publisher and 
developer THQ closed its Australian studios and publishing arm in 2011 (Souri, 2011). A year 
later they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US and by January 2013 their associated 
licenses and intellectual properties had been sold or auctioned off. Most recently, in 2015, 
Canberra-based 2K Australia, one of the remaining larger AAA-style traditional studios 
operating out of Australia, also shut down due to the costs of operating out of Australia (Serrels, 
2015). 
According to the Games Developers Association of Australia (GDAA), the main advocacy and 
professional association for the industry, somewhere between 60-70% of industry workers had 
either moved to another industry (many skills, pre-eminently programming skills, are very 
transferable) or had left Australia for more resilient industry locations and/or those better 
supported by government policy and programs (Reed, 2014a). 
In 2014, the GDAA characterised the industry as composed of 200 formally registered 
businesses, of which 92% are considered to be independents (Reed, 2014a). It defines 
‘independent’ as a typically small-scale enterprise (generally up to approximately five 
developers) that concentrates exclusively on original IP and self-publishes on the new digital 
platforms (Apple AppStore, Android, Steam). The GDAA believes the official figures 
underestimate the extent of active involvement in the industry, suggesting that there are many 
independent developers who fall below the official statistician’s radar. It documents about 800 
now working in the industry (Banks and Cunningham, 2016), although it does not dispute that 
the industry has experienced massive revenue loss. This is the recent history of an industry 
much reduced in terms of turnover and traditional employment, but one which has transformed 
its revenue base from 80% work for hire to 75% original IP – an almost complete reversal in the 
balance between business models (Reed, 2014b). 
The significance of this, again, is that it indicates a major restructuring of the core of Australia’s 
videogames development industry. In the remainder of this article we uppackunpack the 
implications of this shift, especially in terms of the developers’ self-understandings of the impact 
of these changes in their conditions of cultural production and how they go about the work and 
craft of making videogames. 
Major platform shifts and changes in games consumption, along with new business models, 
started before the Global Financial Crisis, but were massively accelerated by it, and the shifts 
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continue through this contemporary period of slowdown in the world economy. There has been 
major consolidation at the console production end of the games industry involving a hollowing out 
of the mid-range games market, and a rapid growth and proliferation of casual gaming and mobile 
applications with unprecedentedly lower production costs and barriers to entry.  
But how ‘creative’ has been this destruction? Parker et al. (2014) advance the argument that 
severe power differentials between publisher and producer/developer have persisted across this 
momentous industry restructure and continue to compromise local agency in global supply 
chains. After noting the poor labour conditions in the industry globally, Vanderhoef and Curtin 
(2015) observe that ‘the most plentiful and well-paying jobs in the video game industry continue 
to be those provided by major video game publishers either directly or indirectly’. Neither view 
offers much comfort for the idea that this destruction could be in any way creative. By creative in 
this context we mean emerging opportunities that also contribute to a sustainable and viable 
local industry with jobs for Australian developers. While these changes may be creative in the 
Schumpeterian sense of generating new value (both commercial and design innovations) that 
we see in the emergence of games made by Australian developers for these platforms, we ask 
how sustainable are they, and do they shift at all the significant power differentials that still 
characterise Australian developers’ relationship with international publishers such as EA or 
Activision?  
These perspectives, however, contrast with the self-understanding of many of those games 
workers who have survived the shakeout, or who are sufficiently new to the industry to know no 
other conditions.1 Culturally and industrially, original IP – and the conditions under which it can 
be prioritised – tends to be championed by games ‘devs’ (developers) against fee-for-service 
and as a normative aspiration. Industrially, a dominant narrative in the industry has been the 
desire to move from fee-for-service (the company is a price taker and doesn’t control its own 
destiny) to original IP. Culturally, this aspiration also speaks to many developers’ creative 
impulse and is actually enshrined in the advocacy and representative body, the GDAA’s 
definition of ‘indie’. It is further reinforced by criteria built into state policy and program funding 
support. 
Given the degree to which higher end fee-for-service business has dried up, while essentially 
self-publication on the major digital distribution platforms (Apple’s Appstore, the Google Play 
Store, Steam, etc.) has grown exponentially, necessity has become a virtue. Changing global 
market conditions have crafted an industry which is much reduced in terms of turnover and 
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traditional employment, but now operates within a distinctly disintermediated value chain which 
radically forces the pace of innovation. Despite much critical commentary which treats Apple, for 
example, as basically yet another global corporation ‘taking their (un) fair share of financial 
profits’ (Hjorth, 2014: 281), near-to-global dissemination via the digital platforms on a 30/70 
(Apple/creator) split of income derived represents a better deal in-principle than the power 
asymmetries enshrined in dealing with the major publishers. 
Australian companies, in particular Halfbrick with their huge success with Fruit Ninja (2010), 
were market leaders in the early days of apps-driven games and became a sort of template for 
national ruminations on how to succeed in the new environment (Banks and Cunningham, 
2013). It is distinctly harder now to capture attention and the commercial success that Halfbrick 
achieved with Fruit Ninja – massively lower barriers to entry create conditions in which it is 
estimated that more than 1.3 million apps are now available on the Appstore with duplication 
across the platforms, of which around 20% are games (Statista, 2014a; 2014b).  
Nevertheless, there are still Australian developers achieving commercial success. For example, 
Crossy Road (www.crossyroad.com), a mobile videogame released for iOS in November 2014 
made by three Victorian based developers (Andy Sum, Matt Hall and Ben Weatherall of indie 
studio Hipster Whale) generated AUD$10,000,000 in the 90 days following release. The game 
combines a Frogger and Flappy Bird inspired design with an innovative free-to-play model that 
includes in-app advertising and in-app purchases. But, before assuming that Hipster Whale may 
now provide a model for games development here in Australia, it is worth noting Hall’s comment 
in his 2015 Games Developers Conference presentation that there were ‘a lot of years where I 
earned absolutely nothing’ (Tach, 2015). Industry commentator Dave Tach, suggests that 
‘Crossy Road is the rare story of success at the intersection of art, commerce, design and 
marketing’ (Tach, 2015). Tach highlights the difficulty of gaining attention and commercial 
viability in the rapidly crowded market for these games.  
Many of the developers we interviewed commented that their experience of mobile games 
production is markedly less driven by ‘the crunch’ (long and excessive working hours in order to 
meet deadlines) associated with games development under the dominant business model of fee 
for service work in which development schedules were driven by milestones set at the behest of 
large international publishers. Developers’ often expressed the opinion that, by pursuing original 
IP titles for mobile devices, they are no longer at the mercy of middle managers in Seattle, Los 
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Angeles or Tokyo. This has led, GDAA President Antony Reed suggests, to a situation where 
the industry has seen much less attrition in last few years.  
There is also radical innovation with the rapid shift from games-as-a-product to games-as-a-
service, driving the mobile apps purchase price points to zero, accompanied by the proliferation 
of in-app purchasing. This carries as much danger as opportunity for Australian developers, 
some of whom have challenged it by reverting to upfront mobile app pricing as well as premium 
pricing for games released through Steam. A good example is Melbourne-based League of 
Geeks in development game Armello (League of Geeks, 2014; Dean, 2014), which was 
released on Steam in 2015 with a premium price point. In interviews, League of Geeks’ Trent 
Kusters noted their decision to shift the business model for Armello from a free to play title to a 
price point release on Steam as they were concerned the game would become lost in the glut of 
free to play mobile and tablet releases. Kusters hoped that Armello would have a stronger 
chance to gain attention on Steam. 
Elevating original IP to a level of high principle may reflect a more unchained, assertive 
developer culture. However, it is also as much a case of turning necessity into a virtue, and is 
no guaranteed panacea. General conditions of precarity have indeed persisted across the 
industry’s recent transformation, especially the rapid growth of smaller developers making 
games for the mobile and tablet markets, and the workplace cultures of the new and surviving 
companies have changed markedly. We examine this proliferation of business models and 
consider how they can be seen as a ‘tale of three cities’ – that is, as emanating from differently 
nuanced developer and industry cultures across the three main sites of the industry.  
Business models, culture, locale: A tale of three cities 
The creative destruction unleashed on the industry has generated a proliferation of business 
models and a sharpening and deepening of localised differences in the main production centres 
that have strong cultural, institutional and policy roots. 
Based upon our interviews and other discussions with developers, the Australian developers 
approach funding and then releasing their games through five broadly distinct models: 
subscription; premium payment; free-to-play with in-game monetisation; advertising supported; 
and, pay-to-play. The subscription model is consistent with the games-as-service approach, 
whereby each set period, usually monthly, the player pays to stay engaged with the game. This 
is typical of games such as World of Warcraft, which continues to have a significant player base 
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ten years after launch. The premium model is very much the traditional model for the games 
industry and is consistent with the games-as-product approach. The consumer pays for a 
complete experience with a one-off payment as typified in AAA titles, such as Call of Duty, or 
Minecraft.  
Free-to-play can be adopted in a variety of forms, placing this category in both games-as-
product, where you pay to unlock additional content but expenditure is capped (for example 
Puzzle Retreat), or in a games-as-service form, where no cap on monetary expense exists (for 
example, Clash of Clans, or Kixeye’s VEGA Conflict). The advertising supported revenue model 
leverages advertising as the primary source of income by inserting advertising at regular, or 
semi-regular, intervals; it is most typical of browser-based flash games. The in-app advertising 
model has been implemented successfully in Crossy Road. The final model is the pay-to-play 
monetisation model. Typified by the original arcade machines, each play of the game requires 
an input of credit for the player to progress. The developers that we discuss in this article have 
tended to focus on emerging opportunities of free-to-play and premium payment approaches, 
especially in the context of the shift towards games as service.  
Our research with local developers suggests that the funding for games development in 
Australia tends to take five distinct forms based on the sources of funding. Developers may use 
one or more of these methods depending on the available options and the scale of the project. 
These sources include: government funding, in the form of loans or grants, with funds available 
not just for development costs, but also for travel costs, or to engage marketing expertise (for 
example Film Victoria’s funding support for games development 
http://www.film.vic.gov.au/funding/games); crowdfunding, through platforms such as Kickstarter; 
the traditional publisher model, where the developer is engaged to produce content at a set fee 
and with set milestones for delivery, which is essentially work-for-hire; variations on the work-
for-hire approach, which may involve undertaking projects such as game installations, serious 
games, or non-gaming apps; and, securing donations, where donations are received against the 
development costs.  
Business model experimentation is embedded in developer identity and production culture. In 
our interviews, we probed for the human and cultural dynamics required to survive the perfect 
storm we have described. In researching games developers and studio cultures, it is important 
to keep in mind that there is not a singular, homogeneous game developer identity. As Keogh 
(2015: 152) argues, ‘a far more diverse range of creators, audiences, and modes of videogame 
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production and consumption has emerged with the rise of digital distribution and a proliferation 
of platforms’. However, Keogh also carefully notes that this diversity in terms of developers 
remains largely male dominated (158). Gender remains a pressing problem for the videogames 
industry, including in Australia. The overwhelmingly male-dominated developer base needs to 
change (Banks and Cunningham, 2016: 195). 
 Far from a homogeneous Australian industry, we are seeing a diversity of models and 
approaches and further research is needed to comprehensively map, the ecology of games 
development in Australia. For example, programmers, designers, producers, artists and CEOs 
inflect their accounts of what’s important and significant to the craft of making games in quite 
different ways. However, what came through clearly in their various accounts was a sense of 
pride in the fact that they were still making games. They and their fellow developers had found a 
way to survive the changes sweeping through the Australian industry over the past few years.  
Much like the Halfbrick developers mentioned before (see also Banks and Cunningham, 2013), 
many also emphasised that they were now doing this more on their terms and that the shift from 
fee for service to original IP meant they enjoyed greater creative control and autonomy. In 
describing this sense of creative control none of the developers were especially panglossian or 
naïve about the challenges and precarity confronting Australian-based developers. Many told us 
about the pain of downsizing and seeing fellow workers losing their jobs with many heading 
overseas to the USA, UK and Canada. Others told us about their companies being repeatedly 
on the brink of closure, and yet finding a way to keep the doors open. The above assertion of 
creative control came through in a comment by Dean Ferguson at 5Lives, a Brisbane-based 
group of five developers making the Kickstarter funded game Satellite Reign. When asked 
about the experience of making games post the Australian games development industry crash, 
and how the Kickstarter funding approach had changed his experience of making games and 
working in the industry, he replied, ‘It’s probably the first time in a number of years where I've 
felt like I’m crafting a game and not simply part of a cog. Before “the crash” I worked with, and 
formed great relationships with many very creative people, with really well-meaning people, 
including publishers, but it often came down to pure economics much of the time. It could be a 
real struggle to just craft something, and while it sounds tacky, a lot of us do this largely for the 
love of crafting’ (Ferguson, 2014). 
Many of the developers we interviewed expressed their view that there is a great deal more 
innovation and creative potential in original IP. On the other hand, even as substantial fee-for-
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service work has diminished for most Australian developers, some companies continue to 
pursue fee-for-service work to offset the risk associated with free-to-play, and indeed making 
original IP games generally. For some developers, work-for-hire remains important to the 
sustainability of their studios. 
There are also significant regional differences across the main locales of videogames 
development – Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney. A sense of localised, embedded production 
culture, localised industry structures and state action, and cultural contexts was emergent in 
field research as key to how business models were selected and articulated. The developers 
suggested that Melbourne was characterised by a thriving indie scene with much more of a 
games-as-art approach than just chasing commercial success. A common theme was that this 
had perhaps been supported and encouraged over the past few years by Victorian state 
government funding schemes (for example, Film Victoria Games Development schemes 
https://www.film.vic.gov.au/funding/games-funding/) that were lacking in many other states. In 
April 2015 Martin Foley, Victoria’s Minister for Creative Industries announced an additional 
AUD$340,000 in funding for Film Victoria’s Assigned Production scheme that provides up to 
AUD$150,000 to support developing a full game, a prototype, and also supports marketing and 
related expenses. 
A further example of recent Victorian government support is The Arcade.  An initiative of the 
GDAA, which also receives funding from the Victorian State Government, The Arcade is a 
shared working space in Melbourne CBD that supports small developers and enterprises in the 
industry by providing rented space. Distinct from collaborative spaces, or incubators, The 
Arcade fosters a sharing of knowledge and resources by creating employment, enhancing 
talent, and creating an environment of sustainability and viability. In interview, Trent Kusters 
(2014) of Melbourne’s League of Geeks repeatedly emphasised the significance of the 
continued support from the Victorian state government that they had benefited from. This view 
was also expressed recently by many developers in their submissions to the Senate 
Environment and Communications Committee Inquiry into the Future of Australia’s videogame 
development industry. 
The consensus among the developers that we interviewed was that the centre of gravity for 
games development in Australia had shifted from Queensland to Melbourne and that the lack of 
government support in Queensland may have contributed to this shift. The games support that 
has existed in Queensland had come from industry and innovation portfolios, although the small 
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amount that exists now is with Screen Queensland. Queensland enjoyed a thriving cluster of 
games developers, including leading studios such as THQ Studio Australia, Pandemic and 
Krome Studios. We have covered the demise of these firms earlier as their business model of 
largely work-for-hire was undercut by the various changes we described. However, it is notable 
that the relative lack of directed state government funding support in Queensland has seen a far 
less resurgent independent developer scene in Queensland when compared to Victoria. Notable 
exceptions here include Halfbrick Studios and Defiant Development.  
Both Queensland (Brisbane) and New South Wales (Sydney) were viewed as having much 
more of a commercial and market focus than Melbourne. This especially came through in the 
interview with Morgan Jaffit (Director of Brisbane-based Defiant Development). Defiant released 
Hand of Fate, which combines card game and action role-playing, through Steam in February 
2015. Hand of Fate also received Kickstarter funding. When asked to compare games 
development in Brisbane and Melbourne, Jaffit observed, ‘I’d say here there’s a bit more of a 
commercial focus, or at least there has been in the Brisbane indie scene’. He added speaking of 
Brisbane, ‘There’s a lack of funding here. A lack of regular events. We tend to see each other in 
Melbourne’ (Jaffit, 2014). Jaffit also commented on what he perceived to be a hostility towards, 
or rejection of, work for hire among many Melbourne-based developers, commenting: ‘I think 
that’s the difference, they’re immersed in the free play market. I think arts is fine, and some of 
the arts projects are making money too’. He added, ‘I think it’s fair to say that Melbourne has a 
unique thing. I’m not positive those are just a Brisbane and Melbourne split’.  
Jaffit, however, also warned us not to overly generalise these perceived differences, especially 
between Brisbane and Melbourne: ‘There’s a commonality there. I would hesitate to say there’s 
a Brisbane commonality through all of us and I’d much more say we’re pretty idiosyncratic when 
it comes down to it .... Whereas Melbourne is very interlinked. There is a commonality across 
the developers, there’s a lot of social engagement, and regular contact’. In short, Jaffit 
considered Melbourne to have an emerging indie scene that was better supported by 
government funding, whereas development in Brisbane and Sydney was more disparate and 
commercial in focus. When describing Sydney-based games development, he considered it was 
generally much more closely connected to relationships with media companies. As he put it: 
‘[On] the more traditional screen side, or on the advertising side, there’s so many different 
companies in Sydney competing for business … and they all have a different approach’.  
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When discussing the Melbourne games development scene, Trent Kusters of League of Geeks 
notes that, before the GFC, he did not think ‘we [Australian developers] created … good games, 
good ground-breaking games, good game experiences on a critical level’ (Kusters, 2014). He 
suggests that the games culture emerging especially from the Melbourne indie scene is now 
fostering more of a cultural and critical discussion around videogames in Australia. Kusters 
emphasised that many of the Melbourne-based developers were also pursuing commercial 
viability and success but increasingly in the context of a more critical arts-driven approach.  
In discussing Brisbane’s games development community, both Halfbrick’s CEO Shainiel Deo 
and Defiant’s Morgan Jaffit (both senior figures in games development) emphasised their aim of 
developing viable and sustainable studios over a long term that could provide jobs, training and 
opportunities for emerging developers. They suggested this may differentiate many Brisbane 
developers from the more games-as-art focus of Melbourne as it requires more of a commercial 
focus, especially in the absence of the kinds of state government support grants that many 
Melbourne-based developers enjoy. Jaffit mentioned a conversation he had had with a 
Melbourne-based developer: ‘They said, “I have no interest in doing work for hire projects. I 
wouldn’t do work for hire projects because I didn’t get into this industry to make someone else’s 
games. You know the whole reason to have a games company is to make games I want to 
make”’. Contrasting with this, Jaffit said, ‘The whole reason I’ve got a games company is so that 
we can employ the talent that is in Australia and hopefully have the bit of the industry we’ve got 
impact on in a better place than it was when we came along. Yeah, those are different goals’ 
(Jaffit, 2014). 
The strong and often negative opinions expressed by many Australian developers about work 
for hire and favouring a studio model grounded in original IP needs to be understood in the 
context of their experiences working in studios when working for hire was the predominant 
business model in Australia. Many reported the excessive crunch associated with this work and 
their sense of lack of creative control. They also invariably commented that all of this did not 
provide a sustainable local industry as many, if not most, of the local work for hire focused 
studios have collapsed. However, it should be noted that studios such as Melbourne’s Wicked 
Witch still undertake and value work for hire as a significant element of their business.  
We also note that these tensions concerning work-for-hire and indie development certainly 
represent, as Brendan Keogh (2015) identifies, the emergence of a more diverse culture of 
games development. Keogh suggests that the complex assemblage of the videogame industries 
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is shaped by these tensions emerging at the intersection of commercial and artistic values and 
meanings (153). However, our interviews with Australian developers reveal an important 
regional dimension to these tensions with many, if not most, of those we interviewed identifying 
‘indie’, understood in terms of games as artistic expression and opposed to commercial values, 
as characteristic of the Melbourne scene and quite distinct from the videogames development 
scenes in Brisbane and Sydney. In relation to the indie development scene, Keogh writes: 
Through how they are developed, the atmosphere and culture they project, and through 
how they are distributed, indie games are a significant intervening factor when 
considering the values and strategies of the videogame cultural industries and what they 
produce, existing in a symbiotic tension with Triple-A development – both opposing and 
entangled in the narratives and values of the Triple-A industry. (Keogh, 2015: 156) 
However, in the case of the Australian developers we interviewed, the narratives and meanings 
they shared are less just about articulating a distinction from Triple-A development and more 
about differences among different forms of independent development. For example, the key 
differences are between those independents developing games from largely artistic motivations, 
and those independents seeking commercial success and viability, such as Brisbane’s 
Halfbrick. Halfbrick is not a Triple-A developer; that category has always been rare in Australia, 
and there are very few if any developers that could now be described as Triple-A.  
The particular character of games development in Sydney (which is the centre of the broader 
media industries in the country) as a one focused on a business-to-business, ‘creative services’ 
relationship with other media businesses came through in an interview with Morgan Lean, head 
of Epiphany Games. Epiphany employs 12 developers and is focusing on a long-term goal of 
developing a massively multiplayer online role playing game and episodic indie titles. They 
undertake work-for-hire projects for clients including TV channels Ten and Seven to keep the 
studio viable. Lean noted that, ‘the people we do work for are corporates, and most corporates 
are in Sydney and it is a very different type of work, work for hire…. These are people who don’t 
know anything about games generally so we are trying to tell them this will be a branding 
exercise or this will help them in this way of that way, so it’s a lot of education’ (Lean, 2014).  
After commenting on the cost of living differences between Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, 
and suggesting this placed Sydney developers in a more ‘high pressure environment’ needing 
to secure a lot of projects each year, he suggested that, ‘in Sydney, the opportunities are 
definitely [those of] working for groups who are not into games, working for people producing 
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television for example, those are the sort of opportunities that we’ve got’. Lean ended the 
interview by addressing the challenge of creating a viable games industry, including in Sydney, 
in the absence of government support. Commenting on the gutting of the Federal government 
grant scheme (AUD$20 million in federal support for games was peremptorily halved soon after 
the Abbot government came to power in 2013), he said, ‘there is an opportunity in Australia but 
the government does have to recognise that we can make really high quality content that sits 
quite well on the world stage, so we can build an industry in this country’.  
Leon Young of 2and2, a 30-employee studio with a focus on educational games for clients 
including Education Services Australia and ABC, also noted that, in Sydney, the opportunity is 
primarily with commercial clients, although they were also developing games for clients in 
Melbourne. He observed that the challenge in Sydney ‘is obviously cost’:  
You know we’re pretty much in the most expensive labour market in the world … Now 
counter to that is one good government program here for start-ups which is the R&D tax 
concession, we get 45% of our R&D costs back … and that kind of offsets the 
disadvantage. (Young, 2014) 
Leigh Harris from Flat Earth Studios, a two-person PC and mobile games development team 
working out of the Epiphany studio already mentioned, noted that a challenge or disadvantage 
of making games in Sydney was not having the mentoring available from experienced identities 
such as Morgan Jaffit who are very active in Brisbane’s game development community, or to 
have regular access to Melbourne’s The Arcade (a shared space for game developers). He 
commented that these scenes provided crucial networking and collaboration opportunities: ‘I 
don’t think you can really put too great a value on that, I’d very much like something like that 
opening up in Sydney, like a cohabited space’. He also observed the Sydney developers 
‘always seem to be more focused on the business’: 
We don’t have a Freeplay festival, or any festival for that matter, that discusses the 
artistic or esoteric design of the games. It’s just all about how, in a practical sense, we 
get our ideas … into the wider world…. The idea, the kind of rhetoric that I hear 
espoused in Melbourne most often is: “we’re going to do something really unique and 
different and change the industry in some way”… And, up in Brisbane, because there 
were so many Triple-A studios that just crumbled, there’s a lot more focus on building 
teams to be professional and to really have a solid framework from which to go forward. 
15 
 
That’s, as far as I see it, the biggest difference: Sydney doesn’t necessarily have the 
experience and the people willing to volunteer their time to help people set up their 
indies in such a way that they will be best prepared for going forward. What we do have 
here is a very strong start-up culture, so people talking about how to get funding, how to 
get your idea off the ground, how to pitch a game to other people, seems to be a much 
more dominant conversation here than a structural one like in Brisbane, or an artistic 
one in Melbourne. (Harris, 2014) 
Paul Stayer from See Through Studios, a two-person indie PC and mobile apps games 
developer operating out of the Epiphany studio offices that does not undertake work-for-hire, 
also shared the perception of Sydney developers as more commercially focused than 
Melbourne. Melbourne has ‘a really interesting arts driven scene …. very much a “we want to 
build really interesting art” side, and there’s community around that, whilst we just don’t have 
that here’ (Sztajer, 2014).  
It would be a mistake, however, to overly generalise these differences among Brisbane, 
Melbourne and Sydney. For example, Wicked Witch, a longstanding studio started in 1999 and 
based in the outer Melbourne suburb of Bayswater, balances fee for service work developing 
localised sports titles (Australian Football League and Australian Rugby League) for local 
publisher TruBlue Entertainment with original IP games for mobile devices (such as Jet Run: 
City Defender, a free-to-play game with in-app monetization). Since downsizing in the wake of 
the GFC, Wicked Witch recovered to employing, at the time of interview, to some 50 
developers. This is a very commercially-focused studio that is also seeking to maintain a 
midsized, viable studio. 
 
Conclusion 
Australian-based developers have adapted to the rapidly transforming and uncertain conditions 
of the global videogames industry. Some developers celebrate the creative freedom they 
experienced with a shift towards original IP games for mobile platforms, while others caution 
about the design and craft compromises associated with the in-app monetisation mechanics. 
The turmoil and rapidly transforming Australian videogames industry over the past few years is 
certainly characterised by precarious labour. But, it also includes adaptive experimentation in 
studio culture and associated changes in professional developer identity so as to continue the 
16 
 
craft of making videogames in the midst of this uncertainty. As we have seen, this diversity is 
also characterised by differences among the production cultures of Brisbane, Melbourne and 
Sydney that are an indicator of the cultural roots that sustain developer identity and business 
models.  
Analysts who have been very close to the industry and its developer culture stress the 
opportunities the current runaway innovation presents to recapture its craft basis. Asserting it is 
the sustaining heart of developer culture. Casey O’Donnell (2014) declares that games is not 
just a software industry. It should also be noted in this regard that none of the studios mentioned 
above are making games for large US-based publisher conglomerates, with many of the 
developers identifying as ‘indie’. None of them are Triple-A studios. The shape of the Australian 
games development industry has profoundly shifted. This does not mean, however, that issues 
associated with uncertainty and precarity for the developers have resolved – if anything they 
have intensified. We are not suggesting that all of these changes are positive; many changes 
are certainly uncomfortable and raise serious questions about the difficult conditions for 
sustainable jobs for Australian developers. This is what makes the Australian games industry a 
textbook case in creative destruction. 
Notes 
1 Semi-structured interviews with 22 developers from 17 development studios, and with Tony 
Reed, President of the Australian Games Developers Association (GDAA), were conducted 
from mid-2014 to early 2015.  
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